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Preference Change
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Abstract Most models of rational action assume that all possible states and actions
are pre-defined and that preferences change only when beliefs do. But several decision
and game problems lack these features, calling for a dynamic model of preferences:
preferences can change when unforeseen possibilities come to light or when there is
no specifiable or measurable change in belief. We propose a formally precise dynamic
model of preferences that extends an existing static model (Boutilier et al. in J Artif
Intell Res 21:135–191, 2004). Our axioms for updating preferences preserve consis-
tency while minimising change, like Hansson’s (Theory Decis 38(1):1–28, 1995). But
unlike prior models of preference change, ours supports default reasoning with par-
tial preference information, which is essential to handle decision problems where the
decision tree isn’t surveyable. We also show that our model avoids problems for other
models of preference change discussed in Spohn (Preference change: approaches from
philosophy. Economics and Psychology: Springer, pp 109–121, 2009).
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1 Introduction
Standard decision and game theory encode preferences with a static, pre-defined and
complete reward function, assigning each end state of the game or decision problem
(and sometimes intermediate states too) a numerical reward (Simon 1955). In such
models, to change these “intrinsic” preferences is simply to change the game or deci-
sion problem, and analyzing preference change as a logic of change to one’s decision
problem involves defining a game or decision problem over games. Spohn (2009)
shows that such an approach is flawed, because it cannot distinguish between intu-
itively different decision problems. It also doesn’t address preference change when
agents discover unforeseen possibilities or when their beliefs don’t change.
This paper develops an axiomatic theory of preference change that addresses prob-
lems with prior models and that we hope will be of use in analyzing game and decision
problems. Ourmodel of preference change, like Hansson’s (1995), resembles anAGM
model for belief change (Alchourrón et al. 1985): updating old preferences with new
ones preserves consistency while minimising change. But unlike Hansson (1995), we
analyze logical interactions between preferences and beliefs, an essential feature for
decision and game theory. Our model crucially exploits default reasoning with partial
preference information in contrast to Hansson (1995), Liu (2008, 2011), van Benthem
et al. (2009). We show that the problems motivating our account require this.
Section 2 uses natural decision problems to motivate a dynamic rather than a static
utility function. Section 3 evaluates existing dynamic models of preferences, and uses
that to come up with a set of desiderata, as described in Sect. 4. We present our formal
model in Sect. 5. Section 5.4 shows how our model avoids Spohn’s problems for other
models of preference change.
2 Motivation: Example Decision Problems
Strict preference is an asymmetric, transitive and irreflexive relation for an agent
over outcomes, which include actions (e.g., to buy a car) and states (e.g., to own a
car). Preferences can be intrinsic or extrinsic (Spohn 2009). Intrinsic preferences are
not based on other considerations. So you can prefer states that are inconsistent with
reality or impossible to achieve; e.g., youmight prefer to be healthy even though you’re
terminally ill. The reward function of decision theory captures intrinsic preferences:
it specifies the extent to which the agent finds a state attractive without regard to their
beliefs about whether the state is achievable or what subsequent states are reachable
from it.
Extrinsic preferences depend on beliefs: if X is preferred to Y because the agent
believes that X makes achieving some other desirable outcome Z more likely, then X
is extrinsically preferred to Y . For example, you could prefer eating fish over meat not
because you like fish better but because you believe avoidingmeat will help lower your
cholesterol.Decision and game theory capture extrinsic preferences via expected utility
(Bellman 1957): the expected utility of an action sequence a is the weighted average
of the reward at each state s′ that is reachable via a, with each weight being determined
by a probabilistic belief model P(s′|a, e) of how likely s′ is if a is performed given
the evidence e, possibly complicated by a discounting factor that takes into account
how long it takes to achieve the reward. Actions that maximize expected utility reflect
a trade off between what agents intrinsically prefer and what they believe they can
achieve. Expected utilities are rightly dynamic: as an agent’s observations e change,
so do the beliefs P(s′|a, e) and hence also the expected utilities. But for classical
theories, extrinsic preferences change only when beliefs do and intrinsic preferences
don’t change. We’ll show this isn’t always the right picture.
2.1 Extrinsic Preferences Aren’t Always Computable
In game theory, players should play an equilibrium strategy, which specifies a strategy
for each player from which no player would unilaterally deviate—i.e., each player
expects at least as good a payoff from their own strategy as any other strategy they
could adopt, assuming that all the other players adhere to their specified strategies
(Savage 1954). Equilibrium strategies thus depend on the preferences of every agent.
In many games an agent doesn’t know the preferences of others, an uncertainty
that game theory models via a probability distribution over the possible types of the
other players, each type being associated with a complete, static reward function.
All algorithms for identifying optimal actions, like backward induction (Shoham and
Leyton-Brown 2009, p.119) or approximate solutions like Monte Carlo Tree Search
(MCTS) (Browne et al. 2012), require agents to know all possible states, actions and
player types—any hidden informationmust be a foreseen possibility. For some games,
however, agents may start out unaware of all possible player types. If so, then even
if the (intrinsic) rewards over end states are known, agents cannot exploit backward
induction orMCTS because thesemethods require the hypothesis space to be complete
and pre-defined. Not knowing what is possible is more serious than not knowing the
true value from a known set of possibilities, for which well known solutions exist—
we’ll call games where the agent doesn’t know all possibilities games of strongly
incomplete information.
The set of possible player types may be unknown because the agent doesn’t know
all the possible actions other players contemplate. Some win-lose board games that
involve negotiations have this feature (e.g., The Settlers of Catan; seecatan.com for
its rules). The game tree is non-surveyable because there are an unbounded number of
possible trades: agents can promise a particular future move under arbitrary conditions
as a part of the trade (e.g., If you trade clay for wood now, I will give you wheat when
I get it but only if you don’t block me). Since negotiations make the game tree non-
surveyable, players must optimize on a subpart of it. But they don’t know which
subparts the other players isolate for performing their calculations. Thus the game is
strongly incomplete: the players lack complete knowledge of the set of possible player
types, because they do not know which actions are a part of the opponents’ decision
problem. Such games call for a dynamic function from states to preferences because
players must adapt the state space they optimize over when something unforeseen
happens (Degremont et al. 2014): in our Settlers example, an agent needs to optimize
his reaction to an unforeseen trade offer. So agents must defeasibly infer preferences
over intermediate states and haveways of revising themwhen justified by the evidence.
2.2 Intrinsic Preferences Can Change
Section 2.1 showed that standard algorithms for optimization don’t handle all changes
to extrinsic preferences exhibited in games of strongly incomplete information. Here,
we show such games must support changes to intrinsic preferences too (Hansson
1995). Suppose that an agent has never heard of nor tasted turmeric. And suppose that
initially she isn’t all that keen on soup and would rather eat fish. One day she has a
soup that she finds delicious. She asks about its ingredients and so discovers turmeric,
to which she takes an immediate liking. Importantly, her intrinsic preferences change:
she finds turmeric goes well with soup but not with fish, and she would rather have
soup with turmeric than fish (with or without turmeric). Now there are possible end
states in her decision problem of which she was initially unaware (i.e., states where
she eats soup with turmeric), and these states turn out to be most preferred. Crucially,
the new reward function is more than an extension of the old one—in our example, all
states where the agent eats fish initially had a higher reward than those where she eats
soup, but now eating fish has a lower reward than eating soup unless turmeric isn’t
available.
Desires and preferences are parasitic on beliefs in that one can’t desire an object
if one has no idea of that object; there is no de re desire without de re beliefs (Asher
1987; Heim 1992). Agents must thus formulate their preferences over new concepts
as and when they’re discovered and not before, and in doing so they may revise (and
not merely extend) existing preferences over the already known possibilities.
Arguably, this is preference revision triggered by belief change—i.e. the discovery
of unforeseen possibilities [unawareness logics (e.g., Modica and Rustichini 1999)
might be useful here]. But existing game or decision theoretic models like Markov
Decision Processes (MDPs) (Bellman 1957) don’t handle this sort of belief change.
The MDP’s variables and dependencies don’t change over time; but in our example,
the discovery of novel state descriptions leads the agent to update her belief model to
include new random variables and/or new values for existing variables and/or revised
dependencies. In other words, the language for describing the decision problem has
changed. MDPs also characterize intrinsic preferences with a static reward function.
But in our example, discovering novel options prompts the agent to revise her intrinsic
preferences: the initial global preference for fish over soup is retracted. MDPs don’t
capture this sort of preference dynamics either.
Agents can also change their (intrinsic) preferences in the absence of any new dis-
covery or belief change. Suppose that an agent A prefers to smoke rather than not to
smoke. Let the propositional variable s stand for “A smokes” and s its negation, and let
≻ be the preference relation: so s ≻ s. Moreover, Amay prefer a peaceful and healthy
life (p) over a non-peaceful life in which her friends nag her (p). So p ≻ p. But A
also believes that s (defeasibly) implies p—i.e., the two global preferences for s and p
cannot be reconciled, given the beliefs. So suppose A decides to that p is more impor-
tant to her than s. That is, A’s preference for p over p is unchanged, but she abandons
the global preference s ≻ s for a derivative or conditional one: given p, she prefers s;
but if p is false, then she would prefer s—she still craves a cigarette. Now suppose A
changes even further. Aftermonths of not smoking, A’s desire to smoke has changed to
an aversion to smoke. That is, A replaces her conditional preference for smoking with
a global preference s ≻ s. The change from the conditional preference for s to a global
one for s is an example of intrinsic preference change without rational deliberation,
knowledge discovery or belief change. A change in taste may be responsible for this
preference change, borne perhaps from a change in habits. Other examples include:
people who become vegetarians for health reasons, who miss bacon at first but who
over time lose their taste for it; and children who change their tastes as they mature.
3 Motivation: Existing Work on Preference Change
Previous work has classified preference change according to its etiology—e.g., prefer-
ence change due to a change in belief or taste or the environment (Bradley 2007; Lang
and van der Torre 2008). The focus of this paper is not what causes one to adopt a new
preference, but rather how one updates existing preferences with a new preference,
whatever its cause.
Spohn (2009) describes a general approach to modeling preference change involv-
ing global decisionmodels, which construct a decision (or game) over a set of decisions
(or games). He argues that almost all received models of preference change can be
articulated this way, but he also criticizes the approach by showing that these models
don’t discriminate between certain decision problems where intuitively the optimal
actions differ.
A global decision model is like a normal decision tree except that in addition to
chance and end nodes and actions that link nodes, it contains also agent nodes, with
each agent node being the root of a different local decision model. The local decision
trees can differ in their set of actions, the actions’ likely outcomes, and the rewards
of the end states. Varying the rewards corresponds to intrinsic preference change. The
outcome of an action can be a chance node, agent node or end node, and so a global
model can represent foreseen preference change, with the agents choosing actions that
affect the type of agent they will be (it cannot deal with unforeseen preference change
of the kind we discussed in Sect. 2).
One of Spohn’sminimal pair of decision problems that form the basis of his criticism
of global decisionmodels involves intrinsic preference change. In both of his scenarios,
the agent forms a preference at an initial time, and he can either decide to act on it (pre-
empting future ‘agents’ with perhaps distinct preferences from performing actions)
or he can wait and see whether time changes his preference. In the holiday scenario,
the player p starts with a preference to go on holiday (b1) over not going (b2). But
first, p must choose between booking the holiday immediately (a1), or waiting until
the next morning (a2), in which case there’s only a 50% chance that p will still think
that b1 is worth the price. There is no objective way of deciding which of a1 versus a2
is optimal. But intuitively, it seems reasonable for p to mistrust his excitement now
(especially given the cost) and to sleep on it; i.e., a2 is intuitively optimal.
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Fig. 1 The global decision model for the holiday and market scenarios. Agent nodes are square and chance
nodes are round
In the second,market scenario, p is at a market and believes that the goods on offer
are never worth the money that the hawkers demand, nor even the price demanded
at the end of a long bargaining process. So initially, the agent prefers not to buy (b1)
over buying (b2). However, the hawkers are persistent and p must either close his
mind to their offers (a1) and thus stick to his initial preference for b1, or p listens to
them (a2) and risks, with a 50% chance, being talked into preferring b2 over b1. This
time, intuitively the optimal action is to ignore the hawkers; i.e., a1 is optimal over
a2. But the holiday and market scenarios have isomorphic global decision models—
see Fig. 1. This provides insufficient information for distinguishing their diverging
optimal strategies.
The moral we draw from Spohn’s discussion is that global decision models have an
inherent problem: they don’t offer direct rewards on intermediate nodes, particularly
the agent nodes. Thus, they cannot encode the intuition that to act optimally you should
be an agent that’s not impulsive. In both stories, to avoid impulsive behavior is a global
intrinsic preference: but this is a property of the type of agent one is, not a property
of the end states one might end up in. The preference for a1 versus a2 is dependent
on this global preference: for the holiday scenario, if you want to avoid acting on
impulse, then prefer a1 over a2; for the market, avoiding impulse yields a preference
for a2 over a1. Global decision models don’t express such dependencies, and don’t
express intrinsic preferences for particular agent types at all. Assigning preferences to
intermediate nodes will be a feature of our partial models of preference.
There are several modal characterisations of preference change (Liu 2008, 2011;
van Benthem et al. 2009). They define preference orders over a fixed set of final,
independent outcomes, and so they don’t address the problem that Spohn points to,
although in principle they could. But modeling preference change when an unforeseen
possibility is discovered is problematic in these frameworks. Since Liu’s dynamic
operations change the ordering over a fixed set of outcomes but cannot change the
set of outcomes, it can handle preference change due to discovering an unforeseen
possibility only through interaction with a model of belief that doesn’t validate full
introspection (i.e., ¬Bφ doesn’t entail B¬Bφ). Liu (2008, 2011) provides such a
belief model but its interaction with intrinsic preference change isn’t fully explored.
Furthermore, the theory puts very high informational demands on the person who is
modeling the unaware agent: that person must know all possibilities in advance (even
if the agent they are modeling does not), and this isn’t always feasible or practical. For
instance, Sect. 2 discussed game trees that aren’t enumerable—here, this would lead
to a non-enumerable set of possible orderings over all possible states.
To address these problems we use partial models of preference and a proof theory
that supports defeasible inference. Our approach allows an agent to make inferences
about action without being aware of all possible outcomes, and it naturally allows
preferences to order intermediate states in a game or decision. Defeasible inference
can handle this level of ‘ignorance’ because it provides a way of expressing concise
preference statements and using them to predict optimal actions even when there are
an unbounded (and unknown) set of exceptions to such preference statements.
In Sect. 5, we use defeasible inference to construct and to exploit preferencemodels
in decision making. Our method is simpler than Liu’s: agents (defeasibly) optimize
their behavior with respect to a relatively small and inexpressive preference model
that uses only those factors that the agents are aware of and believe are relevant. The
agents will add further possible options only when current evidence suggests that they
are needed for behaving optimally. Such an approach is inherently defeasible: we saw
in Sect. 2 several examples where new observable information is inconsistent with the
existing preference model, making retraction necessary to preserve consistency—a
consistent preference relation being important for the model to have any predictive
power at all (see Sect. 4). In Sect. 5.4 we’ll see how partial preference models and
defeasible reasoning can distinguish the optimal behaviors in Spohn’s holiday and
market examples.
Grüne-Yanoff and Hansson (2009) discuss several models of preference change,
focussing on whether they preserve consistency. Hansson (1995) takes an AGM style
approach to revising preferences: one retracts a minimal amount of existing prefer-
ences to make it consistent with new information. Hansson’s model countenances the
discovery of new preferences over previously unknown options, and so his account
doesn’t fit into the general approach afforded by global decision models. On the other
hand, it also doesn’t do everything that a global decision model or the other modal
approaches such as Liu’s (2008) can do: it does not model the interaction between
beliefs and preferences at all, and so it cannot model classic decision problems, where
extrinsic preferences change because beliefs do. Our approach to preference change
follows Hansson in preserving consistency of the preference relation (see Sect. 4) and
adopting an AGM style approach to preference change. But we aim to handle both
extrinsic and intrinsic preference change.
Andréka et al. (2002) offer a complex theory of preference amalgamation and
change using the notion of prioritized graphs. They offer a very interesting algebraic
treatment for combining preference orders and modeling preferential entailment. But
their definitions presuppose a fixed set of outcomes. They also do not investigate the
interaction between belief and preference change, though their notion of refinement
could be highly relevant to a problem of revision as argued in Liu (2008, 2011).
To summarize, several existing theories advocate preference change in the absence
of any belief change. But these theories either do not handle decision problems involv-
ing the discovery of unforeseen outcomes (Spohn 2009; Liu 2008, 2011; van Benthem
et al. 2009) or they don’t model any interaction between preference and belief change
(Hansson 1995). Furthermore, none of these models support defeasible reasoning with
partial models of preference, which, we’ve argued, is an irreducible feature of deci-
sion making in complex games or games of strongly incomplete information. The next
sections provide a formally precise model of preference change that fills these gaps.
4 Modeling Preference Change: Desirable Features
Sections 2 and 3 suggest five desirable features of a symbolic model of preference
change. First, it must allow agents to construct representations of other players’ pref-
erences from observing what they do, and this representation must be conducive to
decision making. We call this desideratum intelligibility. Game theory satisfies this
desideratum via the posterior probability distribution over player types, which gets
updated via observable evidence. But in games of strongly incomplete information
an agent may not know the set of possible player types—a required element of the
“intelligibility” calculations in game theory. We want a model of preference change
that achieves intelligibility even in games of strongly incomplete information.
The second desideratum concerns reasoning about one’s own preferences as well
as those of others. The logic should support inferences about how preferences may
persist, vanish or change as agents acquire or forget information about their situation.
Even one’s own preference information may be partial when, for instance, one has
incomplete information about the possible end states. We therefore need to support
default reasoning with partial information about preferences, and this partial repre-
sentation of preferences must evolve as the agent’s model of the state space evolves.
Third, following all prior work on preference change, we must guarantee that the
preference relation is consistent. This is necessary for predicting optimal behavior:
an inconsistent preference relation entails any preference ordering and so renders any
behavior optimal. Fourth, following Hansson (1995), we want preference change to be
conservative: oneminimally retracts the old preferences required to restore consistency
with the new information, so that preferences generally persist over time. Finally,
conservativeness is balanced by a notion of entropy: the smoking example and Spohn’s
(2009) examples show that preferences can change without conscious reflection.
CP-nets (Boutilier et al. 2004), a compact representation of preferences and their
dependencies, offer a suitable starting point for building a theory that meets these
desiderata. Cadilhac et al. (2011) have shown that representing a partial model of
preferences via CP-net descriptions achieves intelligibility. They specify axioms for
updating one’s model of the opponents’ preferences on the basis of what they say
in conversation. Section 5 deepens these results, providing update rules for revising
one’s own preferences as well as those of others by observing what they do, not just
what they say. By making the update rules similar to those in AGM belief revision
(Alchourrón et al. 1985), we make preference revision consistent and conservative.
The preference dependencies that are an inherent component of CP-nets provide an
elegant way to encode the analogue to entrenchment in AGM belief revision; they
adjudicate among alternative minimal changes to preferences. Our view of revision
also provides a consistent model of entropy—i.e., where preferences change without
rational deliberation or belief change.
5 A Formal Model of Preference Change
In this section, we describe how we use CP-nets. We supply axioms that update and
revise partial preference models for cases where change comes about because of a
revision in belief, or from discovering new possible states or options that were not ini-
tially a part of the decision problem at all, or simply from changing taste independently
of beliefs entirely.
5.1 A Brief Introduction to CP-Nets and Partial CP-Nets
CP-nets (Boutilier et al. 2004) offer a compact representation of preferences. Simi-
lar to Bayes nets (Pearl 1988), which are graphical models exploiting probabilistic
conditional independence to provide a compact representation of a joint probabil-
ity distribution, CP-nets are graphical models that exploit conditional preferential
independence to provide a compact representation of the preference order over all
outcomes.
More formally, letV be afinite set of propositional variables,which defines the set of
possible outcomes 2V . Then a preference relation is a reflexive and transitive binary
relation on 2V with strict preference≻ defined in the usualway (i.e., o  o′ but o′  o).
An agent is indifferent between two outcomes, written o ∼ o′, if o  o′ and o′  o.
Definition 1 defines conditional preferential independence and Definition 2 defines
CP-nets: the idea is that the graphical component G of a CP-net specifies for each
variable X itsparent variables Pa(X) that affect the agent’s preferences over the values
of X , such that X is conditionally preferentially independent of V \ ({X} ∪ Pa(X))
given Pa(X).
Definition 1 Let V be a set of propositional variables, each variable X i being linked
to a domain D(X i ). Let {X,Y, Z} be a partition of V . X is conditionally preferentially
independent of Y given Z if and only if ∀z ∈ D(Z), ∀x1, x2 ∈ D(X) and ∀y1, y2 ∈
D(Y ) we have: x1y1z  x2y1z iff x1y2z  x2y2z.
Definition 2 Let V be a set of propositional variables. NV = 〈G, T 〉 is a CP-net on
V , where G is a directed graph over V , and T is a set of Conditional Preference Tables
(CPTs) with indifference. That is, T = {CPT (X j ): X j ∈ V }, where CPT (X j )
specifies for each combination of values of the parent variables p ∈ 2Pa(X j ) either
p : x j ≻ x j , p : x j ≻ x j or p : x j ∼ x j where the ¯¯ symbol sets the variable to false.
Let’s illustrate these definitions with a simple example. Suppose an agent prefers to
go fromParis to HongKong by day rather than overnight. If she takes an overnight trip,
she prefers a nonstop flight, but if she goes by day she prefers a flight with a stop. The
CP-net is in Fig. 2. The variable T stands for the period of travel: D(T ) = {td , tn},
where td is a day trip and tn is a night one. The variable S stands for the stops:
D(S) = {s, s} where s is a trip with stops and s is one without.
The logic for inferring the preference order over all outcomes fromaCP-net consists
of two ranked principles. The primary principle is that violating more preference
statements is worse than violating fewer of them. The secondary principle is that
Fig. 2 Travel CP-net
T
S
CPT(T) = td tn
CPT(S) =
td : s
tn : s
s
s
violating a preference of something on which your other preferences depend is worse
than violating dependent preferences. The preference order over outcomes that follows
from Fig. 2 is:
(td ∧ s) ≻ (td ∧ s) ≻ (tn ∧ s) ≻ (tn ∧ s) (1)
For instance, td ∧ s is preferred to tn ∧ s because of the logic’s secondary principle:
they each violate exactly one preference statement (td : s ≻ s ∈ CPT (S) and
td ≻ tn ∈ CPT (T ) respectively), but by the secondary principle violating a statement
in CPT (T ) is worse because T is a parent to S.
The linear forward sweep algorithm computes optimal outcomes for acyclic CP-
nets. Forward sweep instantiates variables following an order compatible with the
graph, choosing for each variable (one of) its preferred values given the value of the
parents. An iterated application of the algorithm, where one removes from the sample
space the outcome that was identified as preferred in the last iteration, yields the
relative preferences over all outcomes [see (1)].
Cadilhac et al. (2011) develop a language for (partially) describing CP-nets so as
to model partial preferences. Each formula of this language is a partial description of
a complete CP-net. For instance, the description language formula y1, . . . yn : x ≻
x(CPT (X)) is satisfied by any complete CP-net N iff CPT (X) ∈ TN contains
the entry p : x ≻ x , where y1, . . . , yn are conjuncts in p (so in N , {Yi , 1 ≤ i ≤
n} ⊆ Pa(X)). A CP-net description DN is a set of such formulas, and N | DN
just in case N satisfies each formula in DN . Thus a partial CP-net DN defines a
partial preference order over outcomes. DN may entail neither o  o′ nor o′  o,
making o and o′ incomparable until DN is refined into a more specific description.
The description language itself has axioms for ≻ (transitive and asymmetric) and ∼
(transitive, symmetric and reflexive) together with the usual axioms for propositional
logic and so delivers a notion of theorem hood ⊢ that we use below.
Cadilhac et al. (2011) provide rules to update and revise one’s partial CP-net model
of other agents’ preferences given what they say in conversation. The type of dialogue
act that an agent performs says how to update the old (partial) model of their declared
preferences with newly declared preferences. The rules allow an existing partial CP-
net to be revised rather than extended to reflect the effects of corrective speech acts.
For instance, in dialogue (1), from the Verbmobil corpus (Muller and Kasper 2000),
the dialogue move (1c) corrects (1ab)—the preference stated initially, to meet on
Thursday, is replaced with a preference not to meet on this day.
(1) a. A: how about, Thursday afternoon, at one?
b. B: that would be good for me,
c. A: oh wait, that says two thirty, not twelve thirty.
so, we can not meet that Thursday.
We forego the details of the rules here because modeling preference dynamics via
evidence from dialogue isn’t sufficient. Cadilhac et al. (2011) don’t claim such rules
affect one’s own CP-net; even if they did preference change also happens when infor-
mation is acquired from non-verbal actions like tasting turmeric for the first time. So
we now provide a more general model of preference dynamics, which abstracts over
the nature of the evidence that prompted the change in belief and/or the acquisition of
a new preference.
5.2 CP-Net Revision When Beliefs Change
Westart by addressing the problemof howbelief change can trigger preference change,
particularly extrinsic preference change. One way to avoid preference revision, what-
ever the change in beliefs, would be to make each preference statement conditional on
a unique underspecified condition. Thus as beliefs change, different equations in the
(partial) CP-net become operative. For instance in dialogue (1), A’s declared prefer-
ence in (1a) for meeting on Thursday is made dependent on an underspecified context
C, say, while the declared preference in (1c) to meet on a day other than Thursday is
made dependent on a different underspecified context C′. These (conditional) prefer-
ence declarations are mutually consistent. But a relation between C and C′ is needed,
if we are to use such contexts in inference and decision making. We don’t know how
to do this in a plausible and efficient way.
Our alternative approach allows belief change that is exogenous toCP-nets to trigger
revision to the CP-net. The general idea is this: if the agents’ beliefs change, then they
may revise extrinsic preference statements in their CP-net, that exist only in service to
some parent goal. However, while CP-nets have the great advantage of representing
dependencies betweenpreferences explicitly and assigningpreferences to intermediate
states and actions (a desirable feature for handling Spohn’s scenarios, for instance),
this makes an explicit distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic preferences difficult.
The agents can choose to retain a preference for an outcome o even if they come to
believe that o is unlikely or even impossible. After all, retaining intrinsic preferences is
rational because what is currently deemed unachievable may later become achievable
(especially in dynamic environments with chance moves by nature). Nevertheless, no
rational agents should act to achieve something that they deem unachievable.
Using CP-nets thus calls for a double interaction between preferences and beliefs.
First, agents tentatively adjust their CP-net to reflect their changing beliefs. But since
the CP-nets retain intrinsic preferences, even if their fulfilment is unlikely, identifying
an optimal action requires the agents to ‘filter out’ from the preference order entailed
by the CP-net alone those outcomes that, according to the agents’ exogenous beliefs,
are unreachable.
Let’s look at the first step: i.e., CP-net change due to belief change. We assume
a standard Bayesian belief model and convert the qualitative (partial) CP-net into a
numeric utility function. That is, the current CP-net description NV , defined over
variables V that in turn determines the set of (currently distinguishable) outcomes O,
is mapped to a utility function u : O → IR that satisfies the following two constraints
for all o1, o2 ∈ O: (i) if o1 ∼ o2 then u(o1) = u(o2), and (ii) if o1 ≻ o2 then
u(o1) ≥ u(o2). These constraints on u suffice to ensure that u is consistent with the
logic of the CP-net NV , but there is an unbounded number of such functions u. We’ll
return to this issue shortly. But first, we consider how an agent can use u and the
updated beliefs P(O|e) to check whether (extrinsic) preferences should change: the
expected utilities are now u(o)P(o|e) rather than u(o), for o ∈ O.
The rule Extrinsic Preference Change below captures the intuition that an existing
derivative preference, which is in service to a goal x, normally changes when newly
observed evidence e yields a revised belief about the most likely way of achieving x:
Extrinsic,
PreferenceChange :
Let the utility of an outcome description p, where p is a formula
expressed with the vocabulary V of the (partial) CP-netNV , be
defined as the average utility of the specific outcomes o that
satisfy p. That is:
u(p) =def
∑
{u(o) : o ∈ O and o ⊢ p}
|o : o ∈ O and o ⊢ p|
Suppose x is a goal, and the agent’s partial CP-netNV includes
the preference statement x : a ≻ a′ (so u(x ∧ a) > u(x ∧ a′)).
Suppose that given evidence e, the belief model satisfies the
following two conditions:
(a) P(x|a′, e) > P(x|e) (i.e., the agent believes, given the evidence, thata′ contributes
to achieving x); and
(b) u(x ∧ a′)P(x ∧ a′|e) > u(x ∧ a)P(x ∧ a|e) (i.e., the inequality over the two
expected utilities has changed).
Then normally, on observing e, the agent updates her CP-net description with a
new preference x : a′ ≻ a, which replaces the old preference x : a ≻ a′ (we’ll see
shortly how our formal definitions of preference revision entail that x : a ≻ a′ is
retracted when updating with the new preference).
This update principle yields (extrinsic) preference change in a CP-net as a result
of belief change. For instance, suppose you want to go shopping (i.e., the goal is
shop), and to do this you would rather take the car than the bus. That is, your initial
(partial) CP-net includes the conditional preference statement shop : car ≻ bus.
But before setting out, you observe evidence e that all the car parks are full. In fact,
your relative preference u for using the car over the bus to go shopping, together
with your updated beliefs are such that u(shop ∧ car)P(shop ∧ car |e) is less than
u(shop ∧ bus)P(shop ∧ bus|e). Then normally, you replace shop : car ≻ bus with
the new extrinsic preference shop : bus ≻ car .
It is important to stress that the above principle says that revision normally occurs as
opposed to always occurs. An agent may decide that even though the expected utilities
of a and a′ have changed their relative order, a is still preferred to a′. This is a sort of
induced intrinsic preference change—that is, the agent is free to pick an alternative
utility function u′ that (i) like u, is consistent with the initial partial CP-netNV (and in
particular, with x : a ≻ a′), while (ii) ensuring that condition (b) is no longer satisfied
with the updated beliefs. This alternative, of choosing a utility function to articulate
one’s initial preferences so as to make revision unnecessary in the context of the new
belief, is consistent and compensates both for the fact that CP-nets don’t distinguish
intrinsic from extrinsic preferences and for the fact that they express which outcomes
are more preferred, but not by how much.
This brings us to the second interaction of beliefs with preferences. Since the
agents can choosenot to revise theirCP-netwhenbeliefs change—intrinsic preferences
needn’t change even when they’re deemed unachievable—the agents must consider
the extraneous belief model as well as the CP-net when deciding how to act. They
should not try to achieve goals that they believe to be unachievable. To illustrate this
step simply, we add to the description logic ⊢ a modal operator B, where the formula
Ba p means that agent a assigns p a sufficiently high probability (Pearl 1988). We
make B KD45, and we also assume that our logic supports default reasoning, with a
nonmonotonic consequence relation |∼; so an agent can come to believe a proposition
in the absence of evidence to the contrary. An agent uses the logic of CP-nets to order
the outcomes, and then uses her beliefs to filter out from that ordering any outcomes
that are doxastically improbable: that is, whenever all of the agent a’s observations
Γ support an inference that Γ |∼Ba¬p, then any outcome o that entails p is removed
from the preference ordering. This is captured in the definition of CP-solution (Asher
and Lascarides 2013):
Definition 3 Let G be a game, represented as a joint CP-net (one for each player).
Then CP-solutiona(φ,G) holds iff:
1. a is a player in the game G; and
2. o ⊢ φ for every belief-compliant optimal outcome o ofG: i.e., whereΓ includes all
the background axioms of belief (including domain-level axioms) and the relevant
premises about players in G, Γ |∼/ Ba¬o and for any outcome o
′ that is strictly
more optimal for a in G than o, Γ |∼ Ba¬o
′.
The optimal outcome according to the preferences in a CP-net alone might thus
be different from the CP-solution that takes extraneous beliefs into account, and we
assume agents act on their CP-solutions. This approach, like that of classical deci-
sion theory, is rich enough to capture a situation where an agent’s most preferred
outcome is (currently) deemed by her to be improbably hard to achieve, while at the
same time ensuring that the decision making is rational: agents will not attempt to
achieve the impossible simply because they wish for it. Moreover, as beliefs change,
so does the CP-solution even if the CP-net does not change. Finally, if the exogenous
model of beliefs and intentions incorporates an axiom that intentions are dropped once
they’re achieved (Bratman 1987), then agents won’t plan to achieve preferences that
are already believed to be true.
5.3 CP-Net Consistency When Adding New Preferences
Cadilhac et al.’s (2011) rules for updating a CP-net with a new preference don’t
necessarily preserve consistency. If the original CP-net contains x1 ≻ x2 and x2 ≻ x3
then x1 ≻ x3 is added to it via transitivity. If this is then updated with the preference
x3 ≻ x1, Cadilhac et al’s rules do only a local revision: only x1 ≻ x3 is retracted. So
the result yields x1 ≻ x1 via transitivity, which violates irreflexivity. Local revision
is not a problem for their intended domain of application, namely dialogue, because
speakers control for contradictions. But updating with a new preference generated
from more general (i.e., non-verbal) evidence needs to guarantee the consistency of
the CP-net (recall Sect. 4 for motivation).
If the partial preference model is updated with a new preference that is consistent
with it, then simply adding the new preference is unproblematic. The challenge is to
define update with a new preference that is inconsistent with the existing preferences.
To ensure that the updated model is consistent, we need some notion of preference
revision. Following the AGM approach to belief revision (Alchourrón et al. 1985), we
define preference revision as a sequence of two operations: downdating the existing
preferences to a maximal subset that is consistent with the new preference, followed
by adding the new preference to the result (so new preferences take priority over old
ones).
One difficulty for belief revision is how to downdate a belief model when there
is more than one maximal subset of old beliefs that are consistent with the new one.
To handle this all theories exploit some notion of entrenchment (e.g., Gärdenfors
and Makinson 1988): a transitive, binary relation on propositions where “p is more
entrenched than q”means that agents aremore reluctant to give up their belief in p than
in q (all else being equal). Intuitively, more entrenched propositions are more useful
in deliberation; e.g., p is a natural law whereas q is a contingent fact. So when there’s
a choice, agents favour downdating old beliefs to the the maximal subset where fewer
entrenched propositions are removed. Defining belief entrenchment involves causality
and epistemic explanatory power, both notoriously difficult concepts to analyse.
Since we’re making preference revision analogous to AGM belief revision, we also
need a concept analogous to entrenchment, to help an agent decidewhichmaximal sub-
set of old preferences to retain. Fortunately, unlike the modal logic of belief, CP-nets
have an explicit partial order—the graphical model—that suggests a natural solution
for this problem. Recall that CP-nets define which variables influence the preferences
over other variables. In effect, the structure of the CP-net defines which preferences
are global and which are derivative. So we can regiment the intuition that the fewer
factors there are that compel us to have a particular preference, the more entrenched it
is and the less prepared we are to give it up (unless failure to do so results in abandon-
ing more preferences overall). This priority for removing derivative preferences over
global ones aligns with the secondary principle in the logic of CP-nets for inferring the
preference order over all outcomes: i.e., it is worse to violate a preference on variables
over which your other preferences depend.
Accordingly, we form a partial order over the outcomes defined by a CP-net that
reflects the extent to which agents would be prepared to give up their preference for
one outcome as compared to giving up their preference for another. If the agents’
preferences for outcomes oi and o j are dependent on each other, then the agent is
equally reluctant to give up either of them. On the other hand, if the preference for
oi depends on a superset of the factors on which the preference for o j depends, then
the agents are more reluctant to give up their preferences for o j . We call this partial
order the preference surrender value or psv (we use the term surrender, an antonym
of entrenchment, because we’ll assign numeric psvs to outcomes where the higher the
number, the more inclined one is to give up a preference for it). Definition 4 defines
the partial order psv in two steps. First, it detects cyclically dependent outcomes in the
CP-netNV and constrains their psvs to be equal. This forms a partition over outcomes.
Then it assigns elements in each partition a numeric psv value: the lower the number
the less one is inclined to give up the preference.
Definition 4 Variables X,Y ∈ NV are said to encode cyclically dependent prefer-
ences if X is an ancestor of Y and Y is an ancestor of X in the graphical component
of N . The partial order preferential surrender value (or psv) over the variables V in
a CP-net NV is defined as follows:
1. For V ′ ⊆ V such that NV |V
′ describes cyclically dependent preferences over V ′,
we say that psvNV (oi ) = psvNV (o j ) for all oi , o j ∈ V
′ (so oi and o j are state
descriptions that assign specific values to each of the variables in V ′).
2. With V thus partitioned into equivalence classes of cyclically dependent outcomes,
we assign each equivalence class a numeric preference surrender value or psv as
follows:
– For V0 ⊆ V such that V0 is an equivalence class of outcomes such that all
preference statements in NV about outcomes in V0 depend only on elements
in V0 or none at all, we set psvNV (oi ) = 0, for all oi ∈ V0
– For any Vn , n = 0, such that Vn is an equivalence class of outcomes in NV ,
for all oi ∈ Vn we set
psvNV (oi ) = 1+ maxo j∈Vn ,x∈V {psv(x) : x is a parent of o j and x /∈ Vn}
Suppose a (perhaps partial) CP-net N is updated with a new preference statement
φ : R(t, t ′), where R ∈ {≺,≻,∼}. To maintain consistency, one first checks whether
N ’s transitive closure entails φ : R(t, t ′), where φ : R(t, t ′) is equivalent to t ≺
t ′ ∨ t ∼ t ′ if R(t, t ′) is t ≻ t ′. If so, then we must change or reset formulae in N so
that the result together with φ : R(t, t ′) is consistent. Following earlier discussion, the
ranking in Definition 5 favours those resets with the fewest changes to preferences of
any outcomes, and more changes to outcomes with a larger psv than a smaller psv.
Definition 5 The >-ranking over Resets is defined as follows:
Resetn(N ) > Resetm(N ) iff
– Resetn(N ) resets fewer equations in N than Resetm(N ); or
– they reset the same number of equations, and:
min{PSV(o) : R(o, o′) is reset by Resetn(N )} > min{PSV(o) : R(o, o
′) is reset
by Resetm(N )}
We can now stipulate that during preference revision, any downdating is restricted
to Resets ofN that are consistent with the new preference and>-maximal. We obtain
the following definition where ∗ is the revision operator (N ∗φ means that φ is added
to N and at the same time other statements are removed if this is needed to ensure
that the resulting CP-net is consistent) and+ is the expansion operator (N +φ means
that φ is added to N without checking the consistency: nothing is removed).
Definition 6 The preference revision N ∗ φ is defined as follows:
N ∗ φ =


⋂
{Reseti (N ) : Reseti (N ) is > −maximal and
Reseti (N )+ φ consistent} + φ, ifφ is consistent
⊥otherwise
We illustrate Definition 6 by updating the partial CP-net (2) with c ≻ a:
CPT (X) = a ≻ b
b ≻ c
(2)
All preferences in theCP-net (2) have rank0 because its only variable X , whose domain
is {a, b, c} has rank 0. So there are two minimal resets of (2) that are consistent with
c ≻ a, given in (3) and (4):
CPT (X) = a ≻ b
c ≻ b
(3)
CPT (X) = b ≻ a
b ≻ c
(4)
In words, (3) retains a ≻ b and resets b ≻ c to c ≻ b, whereas (4) retains b ≻ c and
resets a ≻ b to b ≻ a. Since their intersection is empty, updating (2) with c ≻ a yields
only the new information c ≻ a.
On the other hand, considerCP-net (5)with twovariables X1 and X2whose domains
are D(X1) = {a, a} and D(X2) = {b, c, d}. Updating this CP-net with a : d ≺ c
leaves a ≺ a and the preferences dependent on a intact.
CPT (X1) = a ≺ a
CPT (X2) = a : b ≺ c
a : c ≺ d
a : c ≺ b
a : b ≺ d
(5)
Lemma 1, which follows from Definition 6, shows that preference revision is rela-
tively well-behaved.
Lemma 1 1. Success: φ ∈ N ∗ φ (and so trivially N ∗ φ | φ).
2. Inclusion: N ∗ φ ⊆ N + φ (that is, the deductive or transitive closure of N ∗ φ
is contained in that of N + φ).
3. Vacuity: If ¬φ /∈ N and φ is consistent, then N ∗ φ = N + φ.
4. Consistency: N ∗ φ is consistent if φ is consistent.
5. Extensionality: If ⊢ φ ↔ ψ , then N ∗ φ = N ∗ ψ .
Our result lacks AGM belief revision constraint of Closure, but we don’t want this
because we reason with partial descriptions of preferences. It is a fact of life that
preference information is usually incomplete; we are interested in the process of rea-
soning with incompleteness. Our model for preference change differs from Hansson’s
(1995) in this respect too: Hansson only considers preferences that refer to complete
alternatives (i.e., to elements of a set of mutually exclusive alternatives). CP-nets also
have the advantage of providing a notion of importance among the preferences thanks
to the dependency structure—we’ve used this to guide revision to the most preferred
ways of minimally changing the old preferences to preserve consistency with the new
ones. This sort of guidance is exogenous to Hansson’s model.
Definition 6 handles all the types of intrinsic preference change detailed in Sect. 2
(see Sect. 5.4). It has the consistency and conservativity properties discussed in Sect. 4.
Our model of preferences also has the property of intelligibility. Intelligibility relies
on (a) updating the model of other agents’ preferences based on observing what they
do and (b) using this to support decision making. We achieve (a) because Definition 6
provides the means to consistently update one’s existing model of another agent’s
preferences with any new preference that’s inferrable from observing his or her latest
action.We achieve the second objective because partial CP-nets have a semantics that’s
defined in terms of completeCP-nets,where the latter support a logic for identifying the
optimal action (recall Definition 3 from Sect. 5.2). So we can also predict the agent’s
optimal actions from our partial model: one simply completes the partial model of
preferences by defaulting to indifference for the preference information that is missing
entirely, and one uses the resulting complete representation to infer what decision the
agent will make next.
Finally, preference revision is relatively simple in this framework assuming that
the options over which preferences are defined are logically independent and finite.
Most decision problems involve logically independent outcomes, and our induction
of partial CP-nets from behavior ensures that the options are finite. Our definition
of revision and of ranking depend just on the structure of the CP-net constructed.
Testing for consistency over logically independent outcomes involves computing the
transitive closure for the relation, which is doable in low polynomial time. The number
of consistent revisions to be considered leads in the worst case to an exponential factor
in the revision process, but preference revision is thus decidable.
5.4 Formal Analyses of Sample Decision Problems
Let us now return to the scenarios of preference change from Sect. 2. In the turmeric
example, the agent learns of a new possibility, expressed via a new state description:
the vocabulary the agent uses to describe the decision problem NV changes from V
to V ′ where V ⊂ V ′. For example, suppose that the agent initially prefers to eat fish
over soup and prefers coffee to tea. His or her initial vocabulary V consists of two
variables: D for the drink with domain D(D) = {cof f ee, tea}; and M for the meal
with domain D(M) = { f ish, soup}. The (partial) CP-net NV is (6):
CPT (D) = cof f ee ≻ tea
C PT (M) = f ish ≻ soup
(6)
We will now illustrate different effects on preference revision with different examples
of discovery; i.e., different V ′.
Suppose first that the preferences over V ′ \ V are independent from those over
V (see Definition 1): that is, for all t ∈ V ′ \ V , a, b ∈ V if t ∧ a ≻ t ∧ b then
t ∧ a ≻ t ∧ b. Then, it is immediate from Definition 6 that all prior preferences in NV
persist in NV ′ . For instance, if the agent discovers chocolate, extending V to a new
vocabulary V ′ = V ∪C where the domain D(C) = {chocolate, chocolate}, and the
agent adopts the new preference is chocolate ≻ chocolate, then by Definition 6 the
preferences in (6) persist in the updated preferences (7):
CPT(D) = coffee ≻ tea
CPT(M) = fish ≻ soup
CPT(C) = chocolate ≻ chocolate
(7)
Now suppose that there are preferences in V that are dependent on the new
preferences in V ′ \ V . For example, suppose the agent discovers wine and
turmeric such that V ′ contains two new variables: W for the wine with domain
D(W ) = {white_wine, red_wine}; and T for turmeric with domain D(T ) =
{turmeric, turmeric}. Suppose that the agent preferswhite_winewithfish, but red_wine
with soup, and also now prefers soup over fish whenever turmeric is available, and
prefers turmeric over turmeric, whatever the circumstances. Then according to Def-
inition 6, updating the CP-net (6) with this new preference information yields the
CP-net (8):
CPT(D) = coffee ≻ tea
CPT(T) = turmeric ≻ turmeric
CPT(M) = turmeric : soup ≻ f ish
turmeric : f ish ≻ soup
CPT(W) = fish : white_wine ≻ red_wine
soup : red_wine ≻ white_wine
(8)
Definition 6 entails that old preferences that are independent of new ones (like coffee
and tea) are retained. Likewise, it entails that newvariables (e.g.,W ) that are dependent
on old ones don’t trigger revision to existing preferences. But if the old variables are
dependent on the new ones (likeM , which now depends on T ), update ismore complex
because inconsistency may result between the existing preferences and the new one.
Computing the update involves exploring the recursive structure of the CP-net. The
simplest case is where NV is without dependencies, binary comparisons only, no
indifference and:
t ∈ V ′ \ V, a, b ∈ V with a ≻ b ∈ NV but t : b ≻ a ∈ NV ′
The question is: should the preferences in NV ′ also shift to b ≻ a, given t? Of course
they can, but this is equivalent to a shift in preferences among a and bwithinNV itself,
because (x∧ t : φ)∧ (x∧ t : φ) is semantically equivalent to x : φ. In other words, the
agent’s preference change between a and b would in this case be independent of the
new vocabulary (or discovery) t , instead being preference change within the “smaller”
vocabulary V (and hence holds within a domain of fewer possibilities). But the new
preference information in our example does not invoke such an intrinsic preference
changeon the old vocabulary; it only specifies how the preferences amongfish and soup
change when the (newly discovered) turmeric is available. Accordingly, Definition 6
yields the CP-net (8), where the old preference for fish over soup is retained in the
context turmeric.
More generally, for any CP-net NV with no indifference, Lemma 2 (which fol-
lows immediately from Definition 6) specifies a general effect of updating with new
preferences expressed in an extended vocabulary V ′ ⊃ V :
Lemma 2 Equations inNV persistwithinNV ′ where V ⊆ V
′ for all pairs of outcomes
o1, o2 where psv(o1), psv(o2) > psv(t), for all t ∈ V
′ \ V . Further, if x : R(o1, o2)
and x ∧ t : R(o1, o2), then x ∧ t : R(o1, o2).
Introducing indifference complicates matters, because given t : o1 ≻ o2 ∈ NV ′ and
o1 ≺ o2 ∈ NV , it is still possible to have t : o1 ∼ o2 in NV ′ . But that means that we
just slightly weaken Lemma 2 to account for indifference:
If x : R(o1, o2) and x ∧ t : R(o1, o2), then x ∧ t : R(o1, o2) ∨ o1 ∼ o2
Next, let’s reconsider the smoking example, modeled with two Boolean variables
S (smoking) and P (peaceful life). The agent starts with a belief that s (smoking)
normally implies p (a non-peaceful life) and the CP-net (9):
CPT(S) = s ≻ s
CPT(P) = p ≻ p
(9)
CP-solutions (seeDefinition 3) captures the agent’smoral dilemma: themost preferred
outcome s ∧ p is belief-filtered out, and neither s nor p are a part of any CP-solution
because neither of them is entailed by all optimal belief compliant states (which are
s ∧ p and s ∧ p). Now suppose the agent adopts the new preference p : s ≻ s.
According to Definition 6, updating (9) with this entails that the preference for s in
the context p is retained:
CPT (P) = p ≻ p
CPT (S) = p : s ≻ s
p : s ≻ s
(10)
The agent then changes preferences again, and updates (10) with s ≻ s (i.e., a global
aversion to smoking). This yields (11) by Definition 6.
CPT (P) = p ≻ p
CPT (S) = s ≻ s
(11)
Finally, we reconsider Spohn’s (2009) examples holiday and market that posed
problems for standard decision theory (see Sect. 3). As suggested earlier, implicit in
Spohn’s formulation is the idea that the agent should not be impulsive: his decision
to buy should be the result of deliberation that is as objective as he can make it.
While the global decision models cannot make this explicit because you cannot attach
rewards directly to the kind of agent you are, we can make it explicit in our model:
we introduce a variable R, where D(R) = {reason, reason}. The agent also has
(intrinsic) preferences over the variable B, where D(B) = {buy, buy}.
These two stories also involve extrinsic preferences. For the holiday scenario, the
variable W takes the value that the agent wait before deciding whether to buy the
product, or not wait (wait). For the market scenario, the variable L takes the value
that the agent listen to the hawker before decidingwhether to buy, or not listen (listen).
The holiday scenario is then captured with the initial partial CP-net in (12):
CPT (R) = reason ≻ reason
CPT (B) = buy ≻ buy
CPT (W ) = reason ∧ buy : wait ≻ wait
(12)
In words, when an agent wants to be reasonable and also wants to (currently) buy
the product, he prefers to wait to see if he changes his mind. After waiting, either the
preferences over B stay the same, or there is a preference change: the partial CP-net
(13) results from updating via Definition 6 the CP-net (12) with the new preference
buy ≻ buy:
CPT (R) = reason ≻ reason
CPT (B) = buy ≻ buy
CPT (W ) = reason ∧ buy : wait ≻ wait
(13)
In contrast, the market scenario has the following initial partial CP-net:
CPT (R) = reason ≻ reason
CPT (B) = buy ≻ buy
CPT (L) = reason ∧ buy : listen ≻ listen
(14)
This makes listen optimal, and so the hawker has no opportunity to manipulate these
preferences. These analyses show that we can better predict optimal action in the face
of foreseen preference change. We don’t represent all possible choices in all possi-
ble present and future states, but rather only current preferences, which get updated
according to subsequent evidence. In contrast, Spohn’s model has no downdating or
revision of a preference model.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
This paper has described decision and game problems for which a static and pre-
defined reward function isn’t sufficient for reasoning about rational action. First, there
are practical problems in games where all possible ways of getting from the current
state to an end state aren’t surveyable. Static, pre-definedpreferences are also untenable
on conceptual grounds, because one can be playing a game while at the same time
discovering its hypothesis space, and preference change can stem from a change in
taste in the absence of any discovery or belief change. We agreed with Spohn (2009)
that global decision models don’t always provide sufficiently rich information for
identifying the optimal strategies.
Weproposed a logically precisemodel of preference change that extends and refines
CP-nets, a compact and qualitative representation of preferences. To handle the agents
discovering new possible states and actions during the course of their actions and
deliberations, we introduced CP-net descriptions: a partial model of preferences that
can subsequently be added to or updated. Indeed, the vocabulary for describing the
game can be extended.We then defined preference update and showed that it preserves
consistency. The explicit encoding in CP-nets of dependencies among preferences
guides the revision process. The result is a model of preference revision similar to an
AGM model of belief revision (Alchourrón et al. 1985). We applied this model to the
motivating examples from Sect. 2. We showed how it complements earlier research
about preference change and in particular we demonstrated how it overcomes Spohn’s
(2009) criticisms of global models of dynamic preferences.
This work addresses reasoning about rational action in a context where preferences
change in the absence of any specifiable or measurable belief change. In future work,
we plan to devise algorithms, both precise and approximate, for computing preference
update and the revised optimal strategies that result. We believe that the resulting
computational model of dynamic preferences, when integrated with a computational
model of dynamic belief, will provide a powerful tool for studying decision and game
problems for which standard models of rational action do not provide a satisfactory
solution.
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